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Abstract: A systematic quality strategy is of crucial importance for the success of 
manufacturing companies. At the same time, the universal applicability and 
effectiveness of implemented quality management practices were called into question 
by a number of major product recalls in recent years. This article seeks to illustrate 
how already simple analyses and early stage design methods can help to better 
understand one of the potential reasons for these failures, namely the variation inherent 
in manufacturing, assembly, and use processes. While usually thoroughly controlled 
in production, it seems as if particularly the risk of unanticipated coinciding variation 
effects remain largely underestimated and thus unaccounted for in design practice, 
sometimes with disastrous consequences.  
To foster the awareness of this variation and to illustrate the benefits of its early 
consideration in product development, this paper reviews one of the most infamous 
recalls in automotive history, that of the GM ignition switch, from the perspective of 
Robust Design. It is investigated if available Robust Design methods such as 
sensitivity analysis, tolerance stack-ups, design clarity, etc. would have been suitable 
to account for the performance variation, which has led to a number of fatal product 
defects and the recall of 30 million vehicles. Furthermore, the disclosed legal case files 
were examined, offering a unique opportunity to examine how technical 
malfunctioning of the ignition switch could stay undetected long enough to result in 
fatalities.  
Keywords: Root Cause Analysis, Failure Diagnosis, Robust Design, Tolerances 
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1. Introduction 
The popularity of quality management practices, such as Total Quality Management 
(TQM), Six Sigma, or Lean Manufacturing (e. g. Chiarini 2011), reflects the importance 
that a systematic and purposeful quality strategy has for companies. In addition, there is 
a wide consensus that a purely production-focused quality strategy, relying exclusively 
on process control and continuous improvement activities in manufacturing, is not 
sufficient to keep pace with today’s stringent quality requirements for increasingly 
complex products (Batchelor 2010, Booker 2012). On the contrary, quality has to be 
systematically designed into products as well as continuously monitored and optimized 
using design methods and available Computer Aided Engineering (CAE) tools. In light 
of this quality-by-design idea, companies have spent a lot of time and money to widen 
their quality initiatives and to complement their production-focused quality management 
practices by additional design approaches (Gremyr & Hasenkamp 2010).  
However, the establishment of a quality mindset and the way towards an efficient 
quality management system in design appears to be difficult and cumbersome for many 
companies. On the one hand, literature points to a number of technical and organisational 
challenges that companies are facing during an implementation of quality practices 
(Krogstie et al. 2014, Booker 2012). On the other hand, the confidence in the effectiveness 
of already implemented methods and tools is regularly undermined by major product 
recalls, e. g. recently launched by big automotive OEMs.  At the same time, even in the 
case of a product recall the majority of manufactured products performs according to 
specifications. Usually, only a small percentage malfunctions, and even fewer failures 
have safety critical effects. This leads to the question of what the technical root causes 
for these randomly occurring quality issues are, of why they could not be predicted by 
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the implemented design analyses, testing protocols, or quality control procedures 
respectively. 
In academia as well as industrial practice, there is little disagreement that one 
essential task to ensure a consistent product behavior and  a predictable lifetime without 
failures, is to systematically account for the influence of variation inherent in 
manufacturing, assembly, and use processes (Taguchi 2005, Thornton 2004, Ebro and 
Howard 2016). Over the last decades, this insight has led to the emergence of well-
accepted and widely implemented variation-focused design methodologies, such as 
Robust Design (Taguchi 2005), Variation Risk Management (Thornton 2004) or Design 
for Six Sigma (Chowdhury 2002).  
At the same time, literature points however to a mismatch between the existing 
awareness for variation and the actual use of corresponding methods and tools. Given the  
tremendous list of potential variation influences on increasingly complex products as well 
as the complexity of many statistical analysis tools (Thornton 2000, Gremyr et. al 2003), 
the time-to-market pressure frequently takes precedence (Thornton 2004).  Many of the 
available quality practices consequently implicate the risk that an analysis only focusses 
on common, hence already-known and predictable, variation sources in late design stages, 
while unanticipated variation-effects are not taken into account systematically. These 
unfavorable coincidences of tolerances, load scenarios, and/or noise factors are instead 
mitigated by safety factors, late design changes, and excessive inspection, still prevalent 
in industrial practice (Ebro et al. 2014) and potentially still necessary to prevent non-
conforming products to reach the market. 
Therefore, the aim of this article is to further foster the awareness for variation 
and to illustrate the benefit of a methodical analysis of variation by means of early stage 
design methods. For this purpose, the article presents a review of one of the most 
4 
 
infamous recalls in automotive history, that of the General Motors (GM) ignition switch, 
from the perspective of Robust Design (RD). A number of available early-stage RD 
methods and tools are used in order to identify how coinciding variation influences could 
contribute to a  number of fatal product failures and a sweeping recall. In addition, the 
legal case files have been examined, illustrating a number of insights about 
design/management decisions impacting the resulting robustness of the ignition switch, 
hence its inconsistent performance in the field. 
In section 2, the paper opens with a discussion of the GM Ignition Switch case 
from a technical as well as managerial point of view. Section 3 then provides the 
necessary background knowledge on different research areas in the field of Robust Design 
Methodology, before the results of the investigation into the effects of variation are 
presented in section 4. Afterwards, section 5 summarizes how unaccounted variation 
could have contributed to the fatal consequences, before a conclusion is presented in 
section 6. 
2. The GM Ignition Switch – a forensic engineering case 
This paper refers to the case of the faulty GM ignition switch. After several severe 
accidents, the case had led GM to launch one of the most infamous recalls of automotive 
history in the first half of 2014. In total, the recall covered more than 30 million vehicles 
and resulted in a $ 900 million deferred-prosecution agreement, as well as a maximum 
possible fine of $ 35 million over GM’s delayed response to the defects.1 As the 
corresponding investigation by the federal authorities also included the disclosure of 
numerous documents, the GM ignition switch case offers a unique possibility for this 
                                                 
1 Reuters (16.09.2015) “GM to pay $900 million, settle U.S. criminal case over ignition switches.” 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-gm-probe-idUSKCN0RG2WF20150916, [Accessed 12.07.2016]. 
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paper’s purpose. The following section presents the available information sources on the 
case and introduces the switch’s functionality. 
2.1. Analysis of the ignition switch – a reverse engineering approach 
Both, the very scarce academic publications (Shaout and Dusute 2014, Jennings 
and Trautman 2015) and the case files of the congressional hearings, have so far focused 
largely on the legal responsibility and liability with little emphasis on design error. Hence, 
they are evidently incomplete from a design perspective. For this reason, three different 
sources of information were used to gather the necessary technical details for an 
evaluation of the switch design: 
(1) Case files:  
The document binders, which were made accessible as part of congressional 
hearings on the website of the Committee on Energy and Commerce (United State 
House of Representatives). 
(2) Internal GM-Report: 
An internal report on the ignition switch recall by the law firm Jenner & Block, 
which was made available in a redacted version (Valukas 2014) in the course of 
the federal investigation. 
(3) Set of 11 physical samples: 
A full CAD model of the ignition switch was reverse engineered from a physical 
switch sample, which was ordered from a spare part supplier in 2014. 
Subsequently, nine similar replacement parts (model year 2014), shown in Figure 
1 (a), as well as one used Chevrolet Cobalt steering column assembly (model year 
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2005), shown in Figure 1 (b), could be acquired to determine if there is geometric 
variation between different switch samples.2 
 
(a)  (b)  
Figure 1. Set of ignition switches consisting of (a) 10 service replacement parts and 
(b) one sample from a steering column assembly.  
2.2. The ignition switch’s catastrophic failure mode 
According to various media reports, crash scene investigators had identified that on 
several GM models involved the ignition key was found on the ACCessories position.3 
The conclusion was drawn that the likely cause of the crashes was the unintentional 
slipping of the key from ON to ACC position, leading to the shutdown of the engine, the 
airbags, the power-assisted steering as well as the power brake unit. The component at 
the root of the problem was identified as the commonly used ignition switch, shown in 
Figure 1 (a). Attached to the steering column, the switch becomes coupled to the steering 
wheel lock, the ignition lock cylinder, and consequently to the key as shown in Figure 
1 (b). Its main purpose is to convert the rotational movement of the key into a signal, 
which is sent to the Body Control Module defining the actual power mode of the engine 
                                                 
2 The sample, which could be acquired for this research, is obviously far from being representative.  
Nevertheless, the available physical products offered a valuable first impression on geometric 
variation of switch components as well as the difference between model years.   
3 e. g. Rogers, A. (16.05.2014) “GM to pay record $35 million fine over ignition switch recalls.” 
http://time.com/102906/gm-fine-ignition-recalls/, [Accessed 12.07.2016]. 
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and the vehicle’s accessories. 
The switch’s basic functionality is revealed by a closer look to its internal 
components and the structure of the relevant interfaces between them, see Figure 2 (a). 
In an essentially mechanical concept, the key is used to manually rotate the switch plate 
in order to define the position of the connected contact pins relative to the circuit board, 
see Figure 2 (b). The actual contact areas on the circuit board in turn define the resulting 
signal sent to the Body Control Module. As feedback to the driver, the ignition switch 
furthermore has two steady modes, which sit between the OFF and the START positions. 
These indexing positions, ON as well as ACC, are defined by notches in the switch plate 
and are active when the spring loaded spring/plunger assembly is forced into these 
notches, locking the mechanism until the key is turned, see also Figure 2 b). 
(a)  (b)  
Figure 2. Detailed view on (a) the structure of the ignition switch as exploded CAD 
view and (b) the function-relevant interface. 
To start the vehicle’s engine, the driver has to turn the key and thus the switch 
plate to the START position from where it has to return back to its ON position after 
ignition. The required force for this backwards movement is provided automatically by a 
torsion spring mounted to the switch plate. On the side opposite to the notches, the spring 
8 
 
engages with a surface on the upper housing when the switch plate passes the ON towards 
the START position, see Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Contact surface between torsion spring and the upper housing. 
2.3. Development of the ignition switch - a managerial perspective 
As laid out above, the unpredictable malfunctioning of ignition switches after 
reaching the market suggests that unanticipated or underestimated variation-effects are 
one of the reasons for the later product recall. However, corresponding variation 
influences are commonplace within product development practice and usually identified 
and successfully mitigated by a sequence of rigorous analyses carefully conducted tests, 
and quality control procedures. In order to provide some background knowledge on why 
corresponding technical issues in this case went undetected long enough to result in 
fatalities, this section briefly summarizes some key numbers of a GM internal 
investigation, which focused on “the circumstances that led up to the recall (…) due to 
the flawed ignition switch” (Valukas 2014).   
Since the ignition switch was designed and produced to an agreed requirements 
specification by the supplier Delphi, there were major failings by both companies 
(Valukas 2014). At the same time, misjudgements and errors were not restricted to the 
development process alone, but as summarised in Table 1 also prevalent in the 
9 
 
organisation and management of change, being one of the major reasons for GM’s 
delayed response to detected failures. 
Table 1: Procedural and managerial failures in the ignition switch case 
 Issue Explanation 
De
ve
lo
pm
en
t p
ro
ce
ss
 
Lack of respect for 
torque  specification 
given the switch’s 
failure history 
“Validation testing conducted by Delphi in late 2001 and early 2002 revealed that 
the Ignition Switch consistently failed to meet the torque values in the 
Specification”. (Valukas 2014, p. 45) 
But “given the switch's history of electrical failures […] [the responsible engineer] 
was hesitant to make any changes that might jeopardize the switch’s electrical 
architecture. Because he believed the Ignition Switch had performed properly and 
without incident during the numerous vehicle-level test conducted on the 
prototype Ion, […] [he] approved production of the switch - even though the 
switch's torque was below the Specification”. (Valukas 2014, p. 49-50) 
Incorrectly diagnosed 
failure modes 
“Engineers ignored reports of the moving stall problem, considering them a 
"duplicate" [of a previous crank/start caused by how the grease reacted in cold 
weather] - even though they were very different issues with completely different 
causes. Consequently, the low torque problem went unaddressed, even though 
now it was causing moving stalls.” (Valukas 2014, p. 57) 
Loss of functional 
overview within the 
system 
“None of the engineers, with one exception […], involved in the Problem 
Resolution and Tracking System process who had primary responsibility for the 
functioning of the Ignition Switch, understood that loss of power would prevent 
the airbags from deploying. […] Their failure to understand how the Ignition 
Switch interacted with the airbags, a part of the car for which they did not have 
oversight or responsibility, was a significant factor in the failure to resolve the 
switch problems in a timely fashion. (Valukas 2014, p. 64-65) 
Culture of silence and 
non-action 
“There was resistance or reluctance to raise issues or concerns in the GM culture. 
If an employee tried to raise a safety issue […], the employee would get pushback. 
And Mary Barra explained that problems occurred during a prior vehicle launch 
as a result of engineers being unwilling to identify issues out of concern that it 
would delay the launch.” (Valukas 2014, p. 252) 
Or
ga
ni
sa
tio
na
l 
Ad hoc approach to 
issue resolution 
The “Ignition Switch issue passed through an astonishing number of 
committees”, where engineers “flagged the issue, proposed a solution, and the 
solution died in a committee or with some other ad hoc group exploring the issue. 
But determining the identity of any actual decision-maker was impenetrable. No 
single person owned any decision.” (Valukas 2014, p. 255) 
No notes at safety 
meeting approach 
Although without official instruction, “a number of GM employees reported that 
they did not take notes at all at critical safety meetings because they believed 
GM lawyers did not want such notes taken.” (Valukas 2014, p. 254) 
Particularly noteworthy, as perhaps the most damning of all, was furthermore the 
decision of the responsible engineer to allow for changes to the parts without a formal 
design change record! As shown in Figure 4, the spring/plunger assembly was increased 
in length numerous times from 10,6 mm to 12,2 mm over the years. While the “change 
to the spring in the Ignition Switch changed the part’s function” (Valukas 2014, p. 100), 
and while the responsible engineer “did not seek authorization of the Change Approval 
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Board to proceed with the same part number” (Valukas 2014, p. 101), this decision 
stayed without consequences. 
 
Figure 4. Change in spring/plunger length  
3. Robust Design Methodology 
Historically, RD originates from Taguchi’s Quality Engineering framework (Taguchi 
2005), which was proposed in the late 1950s and popularised by its implementation in the 
US in the 1980s. While Taguchi’s basic idea of an experimental Robustness optimisation 
has consequently received most of the attention in academia and practice (Jugulum 2007), 
RD research has evolved into a variety of different fields over the last decades.  
First of all, it should therefore be noted that the majority of traditional 
contributions on Robust Design focus largely on the optimisation of robustness based on 
controlled experiments (e. g. Taguchi 2005 or  Phadke 1989). Providing a widely 
acknowledged, variation-focused design philosophy, the corresponding approaches are 
consequently relying on an existing (preliminary) solution, and despite their indisputable 
benefits neglect the disproportionately large impact of early design decisions (Jugulum 
2007). 
In order to overcome these limitations, several research contributions have placed 
increasing emphasis on the implementation of RD principles for the identification of 
robust product concepts (Jugulum 2007, Andersson 2007) and/or their embodiment into 
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robust preliminary solutions. The latter is of particular interest for the purpose of this 
paper, as corresponding RD principles for a quick assessment of unambiguous interfaces 
(Ebro et. al 2012), as well as methods for the design of exact constraints (Blanding 1999) 
or optimal locations schemes (Söderberg et al. 2006) are essential to achieve robustness 
of products and processes. As already specified by seminal work on engineering design 
(e.g. Pahl and Beitz 2007), overconstrained design solutions, ambiguous interfaces 
between components, unfavourable material combinations, etc. are largely susceptible to 
variation and therefore frequently experience production/ assembly issues, reduced 
performance, excessive and non-predictable wear-rates, etc. 
An overview of corresponding approaches for the systematic analysis and design 
of robust products in early design stages can for example be found in Eifler et al. (2014) 
or Gremyr et al. (2003). Although not claimed to be exhaustive, the given set is 
considered as a good basis for choosing corresponding RD approaches in the following.  
4. Analysis of the ignition switch case from a Robust Design perspective 
While there is little disagreement about the relevance of variation in product 
development, the potential benefits of an early consideration of Robustness by means of 
simple methods and tools are frequently less well accepted. Therefore, an exemplary set 
of early stage RD methods is used to prioritise the potential contributing factors in case 
of the GM ignition switch. The investigation is structured into two steps: 
(1) Functional perspective: an analysis of the switch’s functionality. 
(2) System perspective: systematic consideration of components and interfaces 
For a first critical review, all results were furthermore continuously compared 
with the available set of 11 switch samples and triangulated with the information in the 
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case files. Table 2 provides an overview of the variables used to describe the ignition 
switch’s functionality and its characteristics in the following. 
Table 2: Nomenclature table 
Symbol SI Description Symbol SI Description 
𝑭𝑭𝒔𝒔 N Spring force 𝒓𝒓 mm Dist. plunger to switch’s rotation axis 
𝑭𝑭𝑵𝑵 N Normal force at the contact surface 𝜽𝜽𝑶𝑶𝑵𝑵,𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨 rad Measured notch angle (ON to ACC) 
𝑭𝑭𝑹𝑹 N Friction force at the contact surface 𝜽𝜽𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨,𝑶𝑶𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭 rad Measured notch angle (ACC to OFF) 
𝑭𝑭𝒗𝒗,𝒉𝒉 N Resulting forces at contact surface  𝑭𝑭 N Holding force of locking mechanism 
𝝁𝝁  Coefficient of friction  𝑻𝑻𝑶𝑶𝑵𝑵,𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨 Ncm Measured torque level 
𝜽𝜽 rad Notch angle (steepest)  𝑻𝑻�𝑶𝑶𝑵𝑵,𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨 Ncm Estimated/calculated torque level  
𝒔𝒔 mm Compression of spring in groove 𝒉𝒉𝟏𝟏 mm height of the lower housing shell 
𝒌𝒌 N/mm Spring constant 𝒉𝒉𝟐𝟐 mm height of the upper housing shell 
4.1. Functional perspective - analysis of the ignition switch’s functionality 
The first step of the analysis is to link potential failure modes of the ignition switch to a 
description of its basic functionality by creating a simplified analytical model, i. e. the 
governing equation. Based on the underlying physical principles, this model is used for a 
first prioritisation of relevant Design Parameters (DPs) by means of a sensitivity analysis, 
which is then compared to measurements of the available switch samples. 
4.1.1. Potential failure modes 
To identify potential failure modes in (complex) products, authors from different research 
fields (Bertsche and Lechner 2008, Andersen and Fagerhaug 2006) commonly refer to 
the same qualitative approaches. Although a corresponding Failure Mode and Effects 
Analysis (FMEA) was also performed during the development of the ignition switch 
(Hearing, 2014b), the analysis was clearly unsuccessful. On the one hand, the responsible 
Delphi engineers only referred to the force of the detent spring, shown in Figure 4, as 
single root cause for a potential “overshooting” of the detents (Hearing, 2014b). On the 
other hand, corresponding information was furthermore not considered safety critical in 
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the course of the subsequent development activities, as detailed in GM’s internal 
investigation (see also section 2.3).  
4.1.2. Key quality characteristics and governing equation 
An essential step of every variation-focused analysis is the identification of key 
characteristics (KCs), i. e. “a quantifiable feature of a product or its assemblies, parts or 
processes whose expected variation from target has an unacceptable impact on the cost, 
performance, or safety of the product” (Thornton 2004). A corresponding prioritisation 
of part KCs can for example be based on a simple mathematical model of the product’s 
basic functional principle, referred to as governing equation hereinafter. 
As laid out in the sections above, the basic safety-related functionality of the 
ignition switch, i. e its locking mechanism, is an essentially mechanical concept. A 
preloaded spring/plunger assembly is forced into notches in the switch plate, holding it in 
defined positions to determine the power modes of the vehicle. Although extremely 
simplified, the locking mechanism can consequently be described in terms of friction 
forces at the engaging surface of plunger and notches based on Coulomb’s law of friction 
for the purpose of this paper, see Figure 5. The spring force 𝐹𝐹𝑠𝑠, the corresponding normal 
force 𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁 respectively, leads to a friction 𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅 at the contact surface. Only if the applied 
force F exceeds the resulting horizontal force 𝐹𝐹ℎ, and also enables the necessary 
compression of the spring 𝐹𝐹𝑣𝑣, the plunger disengages so that the switch can change 
position. 
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Figure 5. Deriving a governing equation for friction at the contact surface 
The corresponding mathematical formulation of the necessary force 𝐹𝐹 in equation 1  
summarizes the different DPs affecting the locking mechanism, i. e. the friction 
coefficient 𝜇𝜇, the angle of the notches 𝜃𝜃 as well as the spring force 𝐹𝐹𝑠𝑠 comprising of 
compression 𝑠𝑠 and spring coefficient 𝑘𝑘. 
 𝐹𝐹 = 𝑓𝑓(𝑟𝑟,𝜃𝜃, 𝜇𝜇,𝑘𝑘, 𝑠𝑠) = 𝑘𝑘 ∙ 𝑠𝑠 tan𝜃𝜃+ 𝜇𝜇
1−𝜇𝜇 ∙tan𝜃𝜃
 (1) 
4.1.3. Sensitivity Analysis 
The assessment of parameter sensitivity is a further essential task in a variation-focused 
analysis (Saltelli et al. 2009). Numerous methods for this Sensitivity Analysis exist, which 
differ significantly in terms of complexity as well as computational costs, see for example 
reviews by Frey and Patil (2002) or Borgonovo and Plischke (2016). At the same time, 
research also provides corresponding metrics for specific applications such as the 
prioritisation of design parameters in early design stages (Hutcheson and McAdams 
2012) or the quantification of robustness (Göhler et al. 2016a).  
As the available case files do not provide any design information, the expected 
values and variation windows of the considered DPs had to be identified in a reverse 
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engineering approach, see for example 𝑘𝑘0, 𝑠𝑠0,𝜃𝜃0 and 𝜇𝜇0 in Figure 6 (a). Given that the 
investigation furthermore refers to a beforehand defined, largely simplified mathematical 
model, a simple nominal-range based sensitivity index was deemed most suitable for the 
purpose of the analysis. With this one-factor-at-a-time approach, the sensitivity of the 
desired system performance is calculated by the ratio of the changing system output to a 
given percentage change of one input variable, while all other influences are kept 
constant. Calculated based on the derived governing equation, Figure 6 (b) plots the 
corresponding deviation of the holding force ∆𝐹𝐹 in dependency of a ±5% change of the 
input variables and illustrates the particular importance of the notch geometry. An angle 
variation significantly increases the resulting variation of the holding force 𝐹𝐹(∆𝜃𝜃) and 
moreover does not show a linear influence. At the same time, it has to be noted though 
that realistic variation values are necessary for a meaningful assessment of the 
parameter’s relevance. Therefore, all results are verified based on measurements of the 
switch’s geometry in the following section. 
(a)  
(b) 
 
Figure 6. Importance of variation around the (a) given nominal values for DPs derived 
in a (b) scaled, derivative-based sensitivity calculation. 
4.1.4. Initial verification of results 
The initial verification of results focusses on the impact of geometric variation on the 
ignition switch’s basic functionality. The objective is to: 
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(1) underpin or refute the relevance of the notch geometry. 
(2) to assess the applicability of the extremely simplified governing equation. 
(3) to clearly delimit variation-effects from any potential engineering errors. 
The verification consists of an optical measurement of the corresponding switch 
plates by means of optical scanning equipment, i. e. a 3Shape D800® scanner with an 
accuracy of 15 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇, which were post-processed and analysed with the 3D inspection 
software GOM Inspect. As illustrated in Figure 7, the corresponding measurement results 
are twofold. A noticeable variation not only occurs between the different switches, see 
Figure 7 (a), but could also be shown for the two notches on one physical sample as shown 
by Figure 7 (b). While the angle between ON and ACC position 𝜃𝜃𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 =  53,4° was 
significantly lower as the angle between ACC and OFF position 𝜃𝜃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴,𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 =  55,5°, the 
comparison with additional switch plate samples led to an even wider variation window 
of the notches, that is a range of 𝜃𝜃𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 ∈ [53,3° ;  57,7°]. 
(a)  (b)  
Figure 7. Optical measurement for a surface comparison of (a) service replacement parts 
(model year 2014) and (b) used ignition switch (model year 2005) 
This rough estimation corresponds with results of analyses, which were 
previously conducted by different parties during the recall. As revealed by GM’s internal 
investigation, “torque tests reported in 2002 showed […] [that] torque values to rotate 
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from Run to Accessory ranged from as low as 4 Ncm or 5 Ncm up to 11 Ncm” (Valukas 
2014, p. 50). The switch’s performance was consequently far from the specified 
requirement of  20 ± 5 Ncm, necessary to knock the key out of its ON position 
(Valukas 2014, p. 39). See also the measurements of a 2006 Chevrolet Cobalt model from 
an investigation of fatalities (Hearing 2014c) adopted in Figure 8.  
Despite this huge variation in performance, GM seems however to have focused 
exclusively on a “change to the spring […] ‘to be in specification according [to] the GM 
spec for the torque forces’ ” (Valukas 2014, p. 98). In contrast, neither GM’s internal 
investigation nor the legal case files provide evidence that the switch design was altered 
to control or mitigate variation, which is still present in the new replacement parts as 
shown by the rough measurements above. 
The available performance measurements given in Figure 8 furthermore show that 
the rough estimation of a minimum torque level 𝑇𝑇�𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = 10,61 Ncm, calculated in the 
governing equation with a shallower notch angle 𝜃𝜃𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = 53,3°, a changed spring 
length 𝑙𝑙 = 10,6 mm, and the distance of the plunger from the switch plate’s rotation axis 
𝑟𝑟 = 12,8 mm, falls below the reported varying performance of switches in the field. As 
shown by the magnified view of the torque necessary to rotate the key from the ON 
(72° rotation) to the ACC (47° rotation) position, the estimated range of the torque level 
𝑇𝑇�𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 ∈ [10,61 Ncm ;  14,4 Ncm] is considerably lower than the measured variation 
window 𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 ∈ [4 Ncm ;  11 Ncm ] reported by Valukas (2014). 
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Figure 8. Comparison of specified key torque 𝑻𝑻𝑶𝑶𝑵𝑵,𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨 and its resulting variation, 
adopted from Hearing (2014c). 
4.2. System perspective - analysis of the switch’s parts and interfaces 
A simplified description of a product’s functionality, e. g. in form of the above derived 
governing equation, usually neither captures the large number of parts, nor their mating 
situation. This system perspective is covered in the next section through a calculation of 
linear/ dimensional tolerance stack-ups, a characterisation of interfaces between parts, a 
brief review of geometric tolerances as well as a verification of results. 
4.2.1. Linear tolerance stack-up 
With reference to the governing equation, the spring compression 𝑠𝑠 is predominantly 
determined by the linear tolerance chain 𝐷𝐷 = 𝐴𝐴 − 𝐵𝐵 + 𝐶𝐶 in axial direction. Consequently, 
the resulting torque is affected by the variation of 7 dimensions on the rotating switch 
plate, the static (upper and lower) part of the housing indicated in Figure 9, as well as the 
spring/plunger assembly itself. 
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Figure 9. Function-relevant linear tolerance chain for the ignition switch. 
For a prediction of the distance variation ∆𝐷𝐷, an estimate for the potential 
production tolerances of each dimension was taken from the standard SPI (1998) 
describing the accuracy of injection molding processes as shown in Table 1. 
Table 3: Estimated variation for contributing dimensions 
Dimensions  Tolerance 
Name Material # Feature type Size Comm. ± Fine ± 
Ho
us
in
g 
lo
w
er
 
Po
ly
ox
ym
et
hy
le
n 
/ 
Ac
et
al
 
Dim 1 Hole depth 16,50 mm 0,105 mm 0,075 mm 
Dim 2 Depth 12,40 mm 0,120 mm 0,065 mm 
up
pe
r Dim 3 Depth 3,30 mm 0,105 mm 0,050 mm 
Dim 4 Hole depth 6,00 mm 0,105 mm 0,050 mm  
Sw
itc
h 
Pl
at
e 
Po
ly
am
id
e 
/ 
Ny
lo
n 
 Dim 5 Wall thickness 1,60 mm 0,130 mm 0,075 mm 
Dim 6 Depth 7,00 mm 0,100 mm 0,035 mm 
Dim 7 Hole depth 15,00 mm 0,130 mm 0,100 mm 
Table 2 shows the results of the conducted tolerance stack up analysis. The 
calculation of the Worst-Case (WC) stack of commercial tolerances adds up to a ∆𝐷𝐷� = ± 0,795 mm. Given constant values for all other parameters in equation 1 (model year 
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2005), the assumption of coinciding worst cases for all tolerances consequently results in 
a torque range of 𝑇𝑇�𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝑠𝑠 ± ∆𝑠𝑠) ∈ [7,74 Ncm ;  15,92 Ncm]. Even a statistical Root 
Sum Square (RSS) calculation with an accuracy of ± 3 𝜎𝜎, i.e. an estimation met by 99.7% 
of the assemblies, leads still to a substantial torque interval of 𝑇𝑇�𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝑠𝑠 ± ∆𝑠𝑠) ∈[9,39 Ncm ;  14,26 Ncm]. 
Table 4: Calculation of tolerance stack-up 
 Tolerance stack up 
Comm. ± Fine ± 
Dimensions [mm] linear RSS linear RSS 
A Dim 4 6,0 mm 0,210 
 
0,100 
 B Dim 1 – Dim 2 4,1 mm 0,225 0,140 
C Dim 7 – Dim 6 – Dim 5 6,4 mm 0,360 0,210 
Total D 8,3 mm 0,795 0,474 0,450 0,271 
The calculations once more illustrate why the measures taken by GM are 
particularly worrying from a RD perspective. An increased compression of the 
spring/plunger assembly in no way helps to reduce the occurring variation effects. Despite 
an increasing torque level, the model year 2014 is consequently still subject to the exact 
same window of performance variation 𝑇𝑇�𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝑠𝑠 ± ∆𝑠𝑠) ∈ [15,97 Ncm ;  24,14 Ncm], 
barely acceptable given the specified tolerance for the switch’s torque ± 5 Ncm.  
4.2.2. Interface Analysis 
Linear tolerance stack ups, like above, largely simplify the complexity of mating 
conditions between components by neglecting form variation and the design of the mating 
interface itself. At the same time, poor surface design, otherwise termed a lack of 
Interface Clarity, has been pointed out as a substantial contributor to the overall variation 
in assemblies by RD literature (Ebro et al. 2012, Söderberg et al. 2006).  
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A clearly defined interface should have as few contact points as possible that are 
ideally small and positioned to maximise the assembly’s robustness (Ebro et al. 2012). 
However, these basic principles of Interface Carity were largely disregarded in case of 
the ignition switch. An example are unclear location features and the additionally large 
contact surfaces, i. e. more potential contact points then necessary, between upper and 
lower housing, see Figure 10 (a). The same holds true for the connection between housing 
and switch plate as well as between the switch assembly and the steering column, see 
Figure 10 (b) and (c). The ambiguous interfaces lead to unpredictable mating conditions, 
hence an inherently complex and inaccurate variation analysis, and a product which is 
highly sensitive to variation. 
(a)  (b)  (c)  
Figure 10. Large contact surfaces between (a) upper and lower housing, (b) lower 
housing and switch plate, and (c) switch assembly and steering column. 
4.2.3. Analysis of geometric tolerances 
Given the fact that there are no obviously identifiable connection points, , several 
scenarios were defined for the unclear mating conditions of the switch’s components and 
calculated with the dimensional management software RD&T (Robust Design & 
Tolerancing). Figure 11 (d) illustrates three examples of these analyses, which are based 
on independently varying contact points on the large contact surfaces between 
components (assumed to be normally distributed with a capability of 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 = 1). 
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(a)  (b)  
(c)  (d)  
Figure 11. Simulation of tolerances in a (a) robust, (b) non-robust and (c) extended 
positioning system based on the in (d) specified mating scenarios. 
The first scenario refers to a robust 3-2-1 positioning system between the two 
housing shells, i. e. locating points spread far apart with a variation and varying according 
to the flatness tolerance (Comm. ±0,28 mm) given in SPI (1998). As indicated by the 
results in Figure 11 (a), the effect of this approximated flatness tolerance appears to be of 
secondary importance. The displacement of the active surfaces between housing shells in 
vertical direction, indicated by the red Measure, results in 99,73% of the parts within 
∆𝑠𝑠 = ±0,11 mm for the spring compression. In the worst case, this corresponds to a 
torque change of ∆𝑇𝑇�𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(∆𝑠𝑠) = ±0,57Ncm, which is furthermore only marginally 
increased by the change to a non-robust positioning scenario, leading to ∆𝑠𝑠 = ±0,12 mm 
and ∆𝑇𝑇�𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(∆𝑠𝑠) = ±0,62Ncm in Figure 11 (b).  
23 
 
Thus far, the calculations however exclude simultaneously occurring variation of 
different interfaces. In combination with a diameter tolerance of the pin 
(Comm. ±0,12 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇), the third scenario therefore emphasises the possibility of tilting 
components, see Figure 11 (c). In addition to the varying spring deflection, it 
consequently implies a changing notch angle, hence a maximum loss of torque, which is 
given by the vertical displacement ∆𝑠𝑠 = ±0,18 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇 and the resulting angle change ∆𝜃𝜃 =
−1°. Based on the assumptions about the ingoing variation, the influence of only two 
interfaces can consequently be estimated to ∆𝑇𝑇�𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(∆𝑠𝑠,∆𝜃𝜃) = −2,13 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝜇𝜇. 
4.2.4. Verification 
By comparing two dimensions taken from the original design records (Hearing 2014d) 
with measurements from switch samples, the second verification step seeks to verify two 
assumptions made throughout this contribution, i. e. whether: 
(1) the variation of the physical assemblies is roughly reflected by the tolerance 
estimations made in section 4.2.1. 
(2) the effects of poor interfaces clarity can be seen in the difference between the 
component and assembly dimensions. 
For the ten available service replacement parts, the height of one single 
component, i. e. of the lower housing ℎ1, and the overall height of the assembled device 
ℎ2 were taken with a calliper, see Figure 12 (a).  First of all, the measurements of single 
components illustrate that the values for commercial tolerances, given in SPI (1998) and 
used in section 4.2.1, might overestimate the actual dimensional variation. In case the 
outliers are disregarded, no. 1, 3 and 4 in Figure 12 (c), the measured height of the lower 
housing shell lies in a range of ℎ1 ∈ [16,24 mm ;  16,28 mm], and thus even falls below 
the tolerance value for fine tolerances ∆ℎ�1 = ±0,065 mm. 
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(a) 
 
(c)  (b)  
Figure 12. Verification of results based on (a) manual measurements, (b) optical 
measurements, adopted from Hearing (2014a), and (c) the comparison component or 
device dimensions to specified nominal values. 
Despite this inaccurate estimation, a comparison with the measurements of 
assembled devices suggests that a lack of interface clarity is one contributor to the 
switch’s varying performance. While the dimensions of single components are likely to 
be under their specification level, the measured height of the assembled device 
persistently exceeds the specified nominal value, see ℎ2 in Figure 12 (c). As 
approximated by the analyses in section 4.2, ambiguous interfaces and unpredictable 
mating conditions between components appear to have a effect on the distance between 
the housing shells, and thus on the spring deflection ∆𝑠𝑠 as well as the torque level 
𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴.as also illustrated in Figure 12 (b).   
5. Discussion 
The case of the GM ignition switch recall offers a unique possibility to create awareness 
of the relevance of early stage robust design efforts as well as of a systematic analysis of 
variation during product development. It has been shown thus far, that rather simple RD 
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methods can be used to predict factors, which contribute to the switch’s performance 
variation. At the same time, it has to be noted though, that the analysis exclusively 
focusses on variation within the switch. To understand the full picture related to 
performance variation, this section will therefore move the focus to external influences, 
to a discussion of the taken mitigation actions, as well as of the challenges of a coherent 
robustness analysis.  
5.1. External variation influences 
The analysis within this paper focusses exclusively on variation of DPs, thus variation 
influences, which are subject to company-internal control mechanisms. For a 
comprehensive consideration of the product’s robustness, unforeseen noise factors or 
potential variation of use patterns also need to be factored into the analysis but are even 
more challenging to predict. An example of external noise factors is the varying weight 
of the key chain, which can be further amplified by varying degrees of road undulations. 
In addition, the Valukas (2014) report also identified varying user interactions as an 
additional root cause for the malfunction of switches. Depending on the seating position, 
it was deemed possible for the driver’s knee to come into contact with the key. 
5.2. Mitigation actions 
The conducted analysis also reveals the mitigation actions taken by GM and the supplier 
Delphi, which are at least debatable from a RD perspective. Although aware of 
inconsistently and underperforming ignition switches, no efforts measures for  a 
systematic assessment and avoidance of underlying variation-effects is documented. 
Instead, the resposnible engineerings seem to have exclusively focused on “short-term 
containment” solutions  (Valukas 2014, p. 68),  include the increase of spring length 
described in section 2.3, or the use of the key insert plug shown in Figure 13 (a), which 
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aims at a reduced torque that the key chain can transmit to the ignition switch 
(Hearing 2014e, Valukas 2014). 
(a)  (c)  
Figure 13. Containment solutions: (a) key insert plug and (b) CT Scan illustrating the 
effects of a reduced spring diameter 
An additional example revealed in the process of this research is illustrated in 
Figure 13 (b). In a CT scan of the upper housing shell, a protrusion at the base of the 
spring hole was discovered. Originally an assembly feature to hold the spring in place, 
this protrusion was opportunistically used to create a greater spring compression by 
reducing the spring diameter from 0,75 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇 to 0,7 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇 in order to ensure that the spring 
would mate on top of the protrusion rather than around it. From a RD perspective, this 
measure is however likely to entail an even larger variation risk due to ambiguous contact 
surfaces between assembly feature and spring. Particular worrying from a RD 
perspective, the exclusive focus on an increased spring force will in general implicate 
greater stresses and deformations in the switch’s components, and thus potentially lead 
to effects, such as the angled switch plate described in section 4.2.3. At the same time, an 
increase of the spring force also disregard the existence of an upper specification limit, 
i.e. the fact that the customer will be experiencing quality loss when they feel that the key 
is too difficult to turn. By simply shifting the torque to a high level in order to mitigate 
variation instead of dealing with the variation, quality is sacrificed. 
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Ultimately, the authors would therefore like to underline, that all “quick and dirty” 
containment solutions, should always be carefully evaluated from a RD perspective and 
(although sometimes unavoidable) certainly do not replace an in-depth analysis and 
understanding of variation root causes. 
5.3. Further research on Robust Design 
Besides fostering awareness for the relevance of variation-effects, the analysis 
furthermore offers a unique possibility to illustrate some essential challenges of a 
coherent RD-driven analysis. Exemplary questions for ongoing research are a more data-
driven identification of unexpected failure modes (Kemmler et al. 2015, section 4.1.1), 
the applicability of sensitivity and/or robustness indicators (Göhler et al. 2016a, 
section 4.1.3), a more systematic use of manufacturing variation data and corresponding 
standards for design purposes (Eifler et al. 2016, section 4.2), as well as the development 
of a coherent robust design process to align available RD tools and methods (Göhler et al. 
2016b).  
6. Conclusion 
This contribution presents a critical analysis of one of the most infamous product recalls 
in automotive history from a variation-focused RD perspective. The case study shows 
that the application of available RD methods and tools, such as sensitivity studies, 
tolerance analyses, or Design Clarity, allows for deeper insight into the switch’s 
functionality and the impact of variation. It consequently extends previous analyses, 
conducted in the course of federal investigations, which still largely ignored the fact that 
the switch had large variations in performance (indicating a lack of robustness) and 
instead still mostly focus on the analysis of the “nominal design”. 
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In conclusion, the contribution gives a valuable overview of the immense and 
frequently disregarded potential of systematic RD-efforts in early design stages as well 
as of actual and future challenges for a RD-implementation in industrial practice. In this 
way, the authors hope to have contributed to establish a deeper understanding of the 
relevance of variation-effects as well as a more variation-focused mindset among 
academics and practitioners, and to have stimulated future, essential research in RD. 
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